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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose to identify compromised mobile devices from a network administrator’s
point of view. Intuitively, inadvertent users (and thus their devices) who download apps through
untrustworthy markets are often allured to install malicious apps through in-app advertisement or
phishing. We thus hypothesize that devices sharing a similar set of apps will have a similar probability
of being compromised, resulting in the association between a device being compromised and apps in
the device. Our goal is to leverage such associations to identify unknown compromised devices (i.e.,
devices possibly having yet currently not having known malicious apps) using the guilt-by-association
principle. Admittedly, such associations could be quite weak as it is often hard, if not impossible,
for an app to automatically download and install other apps without explicit initiation from a user.
We describe how we can magnify such weak associations between devices and apps by carefully
choosing parameters when applying graph-based inferences. We empirically show the effectiveness
of our approach with a comprehensive study on the mobile network traffic provided by a major mobile
service provider. Concretely, we achieve nearly 98% accuracy in terms of AUC (area under the ROC
curve). Given the relatively weak nature of association, we further conduct in-depth analysis of the
different behavior of a graph-inference approach, by comparing it to active DNS data. Moreover,
we validate our results by showing that detected compromised devices indeed present undesirable
behavior in terms of their privacy leakage and network infrastructure accessed.
1 Introduction
With the significant increase of online threats, there is a growing demand on ISPs by governments and organizations [1,2]
to have a bigger role in preventative cyber security. ISPs actively employ measures to filter spoofed traffic, but can also
have a key role of detecting other attacks [3]. One emerging attack vector that can be effectively tackled at the ISP
level is the detection of compromised mobile devices. Recently, researchers proposed to identify compromised devices
from a ISP’s point of view [4–6]. ISPs have direct access to key network traces and information, which enables them to
perform early detection of compromised mobile devices. Once discovered, ISPs can inform their customers including
organizations so that they can take proper actions [7].
Indeed, organizations have encouraged the use of personal mobile devices in workplaces, increasing the security
incidents involving mobile devices. A recent study shows that one in three organizations has faced a security incident
due to compromised devices having malicious apps [8]. Among other undesirable behavior, such devices may leak
sensitive information, perform unauthorized credit card transactions, and phone calls [6, 9–12]. A key challenge in
mitigating such security threats is to accurately detect compromised devices and take actions. As organizations have
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little control over mobile devices and do not have access to all mobile network traffic, one needs to perform the detection
at the mobile network provider level.
A number of methods to detect malicious apps have been proposed in the literature, which mainly apply various static
and dynamic code analysis techniques [5,10,13,14] and network-based approaches [15–19]. However, these techniques
require the inspection of a vast number of apps created constantly and identify local features of every device and/or
app. Therefore, a different method, that is not only robust but also scales to a large network, is required to detect
compromised devices.
Many free apps are typically developed with in-app advertisements promoting other apps or in-app purchases [20].
While using such free apps, users are often tricked to authorize to download related apps and fall victim to drive-by-
downloads attacks [21, 22]. Further, many users also tend to install free apps that are not published in official app stores
such as Google Play. For example, in some countries such as China, users are blocked from accessing Google Play and
thus have to use various other stores with considerably low and varying security guarantees [23].
Motivated by the above observation, we hypothesize that there exists a homophily relationship between devices and
their installed apps so that devices sharing a similar set of apps will have a similar probability of being compromised.
We thus formulate the compromised device detection problem as a graph-inference based classification task. Most apps
require network connection between devices and their host servers while being downloaded, installed, or executed.
We model such communication involving devices and mobile apps as a bipartite graph where one side is the set of
devices (i.e., users) and the other is the set of mobile apps. To infer whether an unknown device is compromised, having
evaluated several graph inference approaches, we apply Belief Propagation (BP), a well-known algorithm that has been
widely used to reliably approximate an entity’s likelihood of being bad on probabilistic graphical models for large
graphs in a variety of security contexts, including anomaly detection, fraud detection, and malicious domain detection
[24–27].
Essentially, the effectiveness of BP depends on the strength of association between nodes in the graph [28]. Unlike
other applications where associations are relatively straightforward to be derived (e.g., a malware-infected machine and
its activity controlled by command & control servers), it is quite challenging to derive such strong associations between
devices and mobile apps due to the facts that: (1) it is often hard for mobile apps to interfere and taint other apps; (2)
user interactions are needed to take any action.
We empirically verify our hypothesis that, to a certain extent, there in fact exist associations which can be used
to correctly identify compromised devices using 5-terabytes of anonymized mobile network dataset provided by a
cellular service provider. We further discuss the effect of the relatively weak associations in a device-app graph on BP.
Concretely, we provide in-depth analysis on the topological similarity and differences between a device-app graph and
well-known domain-IP resolution graphs obtained from active DNS data [28] and their impact on the behavior of BP.
Finally, we investigate if detected devices exhibit undesirable behavior in terms of privacy leakage and hosting servers
accessed by the devices.
In sum, we make the following main contributions. First, we investigate an association between mobile devices and
apps installed in the devices with which network administrators can successfully identify unknown compromised
devices with little knowledge on devices in the network. Then, we model the associations as a device-app bipartite
graph and apply a graph-based inference approach using the association. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
attempt to use such associations to detect compromised devices in mobile context. The key advantage of our approach is
that (1) it is applicable regardless of devices’ models, OS versions, app versions, or app types (e.g., phishing, malware)
and (2) it can detect compromised devices at large-scale without time-consuming investigation on individual devices.
Second, through experiments over a large-scale real-world dataset, we show that our approach can effectively detect
compromised devices, achieving nearly 98% accuracy in terms of AUC. (3) We further investigate the unique graph
structures of the association between devices and their installed apps, and how it affects the choice of key parameters of
BP and the effectiveness of our approach. (4) Finally, we validate our approach with a post-analysis of the behavior of
detected unknown compromised devices. We show that these devices, most of whose apps are not known malicious
apps, are leaking highly sensitive information in their network traffic, and they tend to frequently access IPs and domains
with malicious behavior such as fast-fluxing or being short-lived [29, 30].
2 The Proposed Approach
The aim of this work is to identify unknown compromised mobile devices given a small set of known ones and the
network traffic data of mobile devices collected by a service provider. Concretely, we want to determine whether a
given unknown device is compromised or not by analyzing their connections to known devices. We first highlight the
main questions and challenges that we must address and describe how our approach tackles each challenge.
2.1 The Baseline Approach
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Figure 1: A device-app bipartite graph model
One trivial approach to detect compromised devices is to compare apps in a device against known malicious apps.
However, similar to other blacklist based approaches utilized to detect malicious entities in the Internet, such an
approach fails to detect compromised devices having previously unknown malicious apps [31]. One thus needs
approaches that can predict the status of devices based on the limited prior knowledge. In this paper, we thus propose to
employ a graph inference approach, presented in the following.
2.2 The Graph-Inference Based Approach
A key challenge to identify compromised devices using an inference algorithm is to first identify meaningful associations
that can graphically demonstrate the homophily relationship. That is, we seek to define an association that is able to
create two distinct clusters in the association graph, corresponding to compromised and not-compromised devices,
respectively.
Mobile users mostly access the contents through the apps in their devices [32]. We thus investigate the associations
between devices and apps. Intuitively, if a device installs malicious apps, it is likely to download/install other malicious
apps due to several reasons including in-app advertisements promoting similar apps [20] and other drive-by-download
attacks. Meanwhile, most apps require network connection between devices and their host servers while being
downloaded, installed, or executed. We thus claim the likelihood of a device being compromised can be measured by
analyzing its app usage behavior revealed in the network traffic. Our key insight is thus that there exists an association
between a device and apps following homophily that can be used to identify other compromised devices.
We present a model to reflect the homophily relationship between a device and apps. Specifically, we capture the
association between devices and their apps through analysis of network traffic (as an ISP has no direct access to devices)
and model such associations as a bipartite graph (Section 2.2.1).
To determine whether a device is compromised, we follow the guilt-by-association principle that has been extensively
applied in various applications with a graph model [24,25,28,31,33]. In a nutshell, the idea of guilt-by-association is to
estimate the guiltiness of a node by propagating the prior knowledge on some of the nodes in the graph model, given
the homophily relationship between nodes.
One may utilize various approaches such as label propagation (LP) [34, 35], BP, or graph node embedding [36] to
perform inference over graphs. We show in Section 6 that the accuracy of these approaches is comparable with BP
being slightly better than the other approaches and much more efficient than graph node embedding. Hence, we apply
BP on the bipartite graphs we build (Section 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Constructing Bipartite Graphs
We represent the associations between devices and apps as a bipartite graph G = (V,E) where a set of devices
D = {d1, ...dn} ⊂ V and a set of apps A = {a1, ...an} ⊂ V are connected with undirected edges e(di, aj), where
di is a device and aj is an app. Fig. 1 illustrates an example of a bipartite graph model where the left side is a set
of devices (i.e., nodes in D) and the right side is a set of apps (i.e., nodes in A). Each node in D may belong to one
of three categories: not-compromised, compromised, and unknown, and each node in A may belong to one of four
categories: benign, malicious, suspicious, and unknown. As illustrated, a compromised device may have edges with
all types of apps including malicious, suspicious, unknown, and benign. An unknown device may have edges with
suspicious, unknown, and benign apps. A not-compromised device may have edges with benign and unknown apps, but
does not have edges with suspicious or malicious apps.
2.2.2 Belief Propagation
We work based on the intuition that there exists an association between the probability of a device being compromised
and the probability of having malicious apps. That is, the more malicious apps a device has, the more likely it is to
download other malicious apps, resulting in homophily relationships between devices and apps. Given the bipartite
graph in Section 2.2.1 and the prior knowledge about devices, we thus aim to infer the probability of unknown devices
3
being compromised or not using the guilt-by-association principle. To do so, we employ BP, which is shown to reliably
estimate the posterior probabilities on probabilistic graphical models for large graphs in a variety of domains including
anomaly detection, fraud detection, and malicious domain detection [25, 28, 33]. In the following, we explain how we
apply BP in our context.
We model each node i ∈ V as a random variable, xi, that can be in the set of states S = {good, bad} so that the
badness and goodness of a node can be expressed by the probabilities P (Bad) and P (Good), respectively, where
P (Bad) + P (Good) = 1. Our goal is then to determine the marginal probabilities P (xi = Good) and P (xi = Bad)
for unknown devices.
BP computes the marginal probability of each node by iteratively passing local messages from its neighbor given the
prior knowledge of other nodes in the graph.
At each iteration, BP computes the message vector mij for each node i, and passes it to each of its neighbors j ∈ N(i),
where N(i) is the set of i’s neighbor. mij(xj) is i’s belief that node j is in state xj (i.e., i’s outgoing message vector
to j), which will be computed based on i’s neighbors’ messages about i. Concretely, there are three components
to compute message mij(xj): (1) initial belief φi(xi) for i being in state xi; (2) the product of all messages from
i’s neighbors excluding j (i.e., i’s incoming message vector from k ∈ N(i)); and (3) the edge potential ψij(xi, xj)
between two neighboring nodes i and j specifying the probability of i being in state xi and j being in state xj . Formally,
the message mij is defined as:
mij(xj) =
∑
xi∈S
[φi(xi)ψij(xi, xj)
∏
k∈N(i)\j
mki(xi)] (Eq.1)
We assign the initial belief for each node based on the ground truth labels, which is summarized in Table 1(a).
Furthermore, Table 1(b) represents the edge potential matrix. In Section 4, we will discuss how we choose δ and , and
the effect of varying these parameters on detection accuracy.
(a) Initial beliefs for nodes in a graph
P(Bad) P(Good)
Bad δ 1- δ
Good 1- δ δ
Unknown 0.5 0.5
(b) Edge potentials
Bad Good
Bad  1− 
Good 1−  
Table 1: Initial beliefs and edge potentials for Belief Propagation
Note that BP is not theoretically guaranteed to converge for arbitrary graphs. However, it is shown to converge
quickly with highly accurate approximation in practice [24, 33]. After the messages converge, i.e, they do not change
significantly between iterations, we compute the final belief for i as follows:
bi(xi) = Cφ(xi)
∏
k∈N(i)
mki(xi), (Eq.2)
where C is a normalizing constant. Finally, we classify devices as compromised or not based on the final belief.
3 Dataset
3.1 Mobile Network Traffic Dataset
Our dataset contains 5-terabytes of 5-days mobile network traffic data from a Chinese mobile service provider. Note
that ISP does not have any control over the apps running on devices so that it is not straightforward to identify which
devices use which apps and build a device-app bipartite graph from the traffic. In the following, we describe how we
identify and extract information about devices and apps from the dataset.
Our approach relies on constructing bipartite graphs using entities extracted from the mobile network traffic including
devices and apps. Fig. 2 shows the fields we use from IP packets to extract those entities. The app string and destination
IPs are important in extracting app information; whereas the source IPs are important to extract device information.
3.1.1 Device Extraction
Following previous research [5, 9, 20, 37], we consider each source IP address as a device. By doing so, we extract
250149 devices from our traffic.
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Source IP Destination IP App String
IP Header HTTP Header
Figure 2: Simplified IP packet with fields used for
data extraction
GET/open/confirm.htm?pkg = com.sina.news
Figure 3: A HTTP header with an app string
3.1.2 App Extraction
Given the ISP traffic, one may utilize various information to extract app information such as app strings in the HTTP
header, destination IP addresses in IP header, or unique TCP traffic patterns representing apps [9,20,37,38]. We employ
and compare two approaches using HTTP and/or IP headers.
(1) App Extraction using App Strings: Although HTTPS dominates the general web connections, the usage of HTTP
is still significant in mobile apps according to recent research [12, 39–44]. Although Android defaults to use HTTPS
traffic in all apps since 2018, it is not strictly enforced, and still allows developers to change configuration to use
HTTP [45]. Indeed, it has been observed in recent study that only part of communication (e.g., initial requests) are
secured over HTTPS [44, 46, 47]. This may be due to a few reasons. First, advertisements (ads) traffic accounts for a
significant portion in mobile networks and ads traffic is mostly carried over HTTP [7, 12, 41, 47, 48]. Further, HTTPS
adds significant costs (e.g., significantly increasing latency and energy consumption) due to cryptographic operations
and a required extra handshake, which is critical in mobile networks [44, 49]. For the same reason, it has also been
observed in previous study that most malicious traffic is carried over HTTP [31, 50, 51].
This approach thus focuses on HTTP traffic and extract app information revealed in HTTP header. That is, we extract
the IP packets containing the app string field in the header. The app string often contains the name of the app binary file.
10% of our traffic includes explicit app strings. An example of packets with an app string is presented in Fig. 3. We
assume each unique app string as an app. By doing so, we gather 5870 app strings from our dataset.
(2) App Extraction using IP: Most mobile apps require network connection between devices and their host servers
while being downloaded, installed, or executed. One way to extract app information without explicit app strings (e.g.,
HTTPS traffic) is thus that we use each or a group of destination IPs as the counterpart of apps since an IP may represent
a server hosting a specific app. As a first step to deal with traffic without app strings, we explore a naive approach to
treat an IP as an app. Note that a single IP often does not reliably represent an app for several reasons [20, 32]. Indeed,
in Section 4.2, we will show identifying compromised devices only using destination IPs results in high false positive
rates. Meanwhile, we discuss how it can be improved in Section 6. To fairly compare two approaches, we use the same
HTTP dataset with which 6150 destination IPs are extracted.
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Figure 4: The distribution of number of devices
3.1.3 A Device-App Graph
By the end of this process, we have a mapping between devices and apps (either app strings or destination IPs), i.e,
edges. Fig.4(a) presents the CDF of the number of devices where the x-axis represents the number of devices having
each app string and the y-axis represents the corresponding CDF (i.e., the portion of apps). Note that nearly 50% of
apps are having only one device. This is mainly because app strings may also include version names or market names
of the apps such as com.sina.news-7.19.3 and com.supercell.clashofclans.baidu, which we consider as individual apps.
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Fig.4(b) presents the CDF of the number of devices where the x-axis represents the number of devices connecting
to each destination IP and the y-axis represents the corresponding CDF (i.e., the portion of destination IPs). Fig. 4
suggests that each device will have relatively more shared IPs with another, compared to the number of shared apps. We
discuss the effect of this distribution in Section 4.2.
3.2 Ground Truth Sets and Definitions for Detecting Compromised Devices
Our approach requires the small sets of ground truth about compromised and not-compromised devices to apply BP.
However, given the vast number of unknown apps and little, if any, knowledge on devices in practice, it is often hard to
build a ground truth set. We first collect ground truth sets for apps (destination IPs and app binaries) (Section 3.2.1) and
construct ground truth sets for devices (Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Ground Truth Sets for Apps
One may utilize any one or multiple intelligence sources to build a ground truth set for apps. We use VirusTotal
(VT) [52] to collect a ground truth set for apps. VT is a security intelligence portal for IPs, URLs and binaries, based on
third-party anti-virus engines, widely used in the literature for building ground truth [23, 31, 53, 54]. For each query,
VT aggregates the responses from more than 50 engines, each of which categorizes the queried IP, binary or URL to
malicious or benign.
(1) App Binary Analysis : To build a ground truth set, we first attempt to download android binaries from 16 popular
Chinese app stores [23] by searching the app strings extracted in Section 3.1.2. App string in the traffic is sometimes
not readable, as it could be truncated or represented as simple digits or a serial number [37, 42]. Among 5870, 2367
app strings were found in at least one of 16 app stores. Fig.5 presents the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of
the number of app stores where the x-axis represents the number of app stores having each app string and the y-axis
represents the corresponding CDF (i.e., the portion of apps). Note that we also verify that the binaries are indeed
generating the corresponding app strings by capturing network traffic while installing and executing binaries on two
mobile devices (i.e., Samsung Galaxy Note4 and Sony Xperia Z3 Dual).
We upload the binaries to VT and check whether it is marked as malicious. Note that 29% of app strings are published
in multiple app stores, as shown in Fig.5. However, we observe that the maliciousness of each app is the same regardless
of the app stores where it is downloaded. This observation agrees with that from prior research: the app string often
correctly represents a specific app [23, 55]. Furthermore, Haoyu et al. observed that recent mobile malware does not
spread by repackaging as much as before in a large-scale study on android apps [23]. We thus argue that it is reasonable
to rely on the app string to identify and evaluate each app.
Among 2367 binaries, 1711 apps are flagged as malicious by at least one VT engine and 656 apps are not flagged by any
engine. Previous research suggests that evaluation based on VT may have a limited coverage or noise due to multiple
reasons [23, 53, 56, 57]. To reduce potential false positives, we label each app using thresholds as follows.
If an app is detected as malicious by more than or equal to vt number of engines among the 60 VT engines, we label
the app as bad; if an app is detected as malicious by less than vt engines, we label the app as suspicious; if an app
is not detected as malicious by any engine, we assume that the app is good; if we are not able to find corresponding
binaries, we consider the app as no-info.1.
Note that we aim to identify unknown compromised devices that may have installed unknown malicious apps. Many
app stores are known to perform a vetting process to identify and remove malicious apps from the stores [23, 53, 60].
As it is relatively easy to detect popular yet bad apps through such a general vetting process, we exclude popular apps
and app libraries. Concretely, we consider an app popular if it is used by more than Np number of devices. This filtering
1For consistency reasons, we follow previous work [25, 33, 58, 59] in choosing “good”, and “bad” as BP labels though they may
not sound technical.
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App
popularity
VT
vt = 3 vt = 4 vt = 5 vt = 6 vt = 7
Not-filtered 1195 1060 955 845 764
Np = 10000 1190 1056 951 841 761
Np = 5000 1189 1056 951 841 761
Np = 1000 1178 1047 943 833 753
Table 2: The number of bad apps with varying vt and Np thresholds
App
popularity
VT
vt =
3
vt =
4
vt =
5
vt =
6
vt =
7
good
de-
vice
Not-filtered 25847 16889 15449 14391 9280 53162
Np = 10000 7547 5347 4385 3621 3169 25782
Np = 5000 6871 5347 4385 3621 3169 24231
Np = 1000 2759 2371 2004 1400 1086 12923
Table 3: The number of devices with varying vt and Np thresholds
is important as it helps us avoid a number of false positives which can be induced by false association in a graph-based
approach [24, 28, 61, 62]. We shall discuss the effect and limitation caused by this filtering in Section 4.2 and Section 6.
Table 2 summarizes the number of bad apps with various vt and Np thresholds.
(2) Destination IP Analysis : Towards dealing with traffic without explicit app strings, we inspect destination IPs that
devices are connecting to. Particularly, we checked 6150 destination IPs in our dataset extracted in Section 3.1.2 against
VT. Following previous research [28], we label an IP as bad, if the IP is detected as malicious by two or more engines
in VT; if the IP is detected as malicious by only one engine, we label it as suspicious. By doing so, we find 528 bad IPs.
3.2.2 Ground Truth Sets for Devices
Given the ground truth set for apps, we define a bad device as one using more than or equal to N(Ab) number of bad
apps, where Ab is the set of bad apps; we define a good device as one not using any bad and suspicious apps. Note that
we have two ground truth sets for apps (i.e., based on (1) app string and (2) destination IP). Accordingly, we also build
two ground truth sets for devices.
(1) An App Binary Based Ground Truth Set: Table 3 summarizes the number of devices given the ground truth
sets in Table. 2.
(2) A Destination IP-based Ground Truth Set: We build a ground truth set for devices given the ground truth sets
in Section 3.2.1(2). By doing so, we found 442 bad devices connecting to 2 or more bad IPs and 13794 good devices.
4 Experimental Results and Analysis
4.1 Experimental Setup
Table 4 summarizes the notation for the parameters used in our experiments.
BP Implementation: We implemented BP in C following the implementation in [24], as it was shown to be fast and
scalable for large graphs. It only takes 1.25 seconds to run 10 BP iterations on average for our graphs.
Ground Truth Sets for BP: In our bipartite graph, we have two types of nodes: apps and devices. Although BP can
be used to classify both apps and devices in principle, we focus on the classification of devices. We thus consider the
badness/goodness of apps as unknown. Hence, BP inference is driven by two different sets of device ground truth
labels: bad devices (DB) and good devices (DG). The number of instances in each set is described in Section 3.2.2.
Notation Description Default
Np The threshold to define a popular app 1000
vt The threshold for the number of VT engines
detecting the app as malicious
5
N(AB) The number of bad apps the bad device has 2
 The edge potential parameter 0.51
δ The initial belief parameter 0.99
Table 4: List of parameters for experiments and default values
7
Note that the original data set is not balanced. It is natural, however, that unbalanced initial belief leads to a biased set
dominating the final result [24, 61]. We thus randomly choose an equal number of instances from each set to avoid any
such bias. For example, as described in Table 3, there are 12923 good devices and 2004 bad devices if we set vt = 5
and Np = 1000. In such a case, we use all of 2004 bad devices as DB , and randomly choose 2004 out of the 12923
good devices as DG.
Cross Validation: To validate our approach, we perform k-fold cross validation. We randomly divide each of DB and
DG into k folds and run BP k times. In each BP run, we use one of the k folds as a testing set and the remaining k − 1
folds as a training set. We rotate the testing fold across the k folds in the k runs of BP and the final results are the
average of the results from the k BP runs. For our data set, BP converges fast, and therefore we do not limit its number
of iterations.
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, each node has two belief scores representing its badness (P (Bad)) and goodness
(P (Good) = 1− P (Bad)), respectively. For simplicity, we only mention the badness scores in this section. In each
BP run, we consider the devices in the testing set as unknowns and hence, their initial beliefs are set to 0.5, as described
in Table 1(a). The initial beliefs of devices in the training set are set according to their ground truth labels. Specifically,
we set δ = 0.99 and hence, the initial badness beliefs of devices in the training set from DB are set to 0.99, and 0.01 for
those in the training set from DG.
Devices in the testing set are labeled based on their average final beliefs. Specifically, we vary the threshold for final
beliefs, and classify a device whose final belief is above the threshold as bad. Otherwise we classify it as good. We
then compute the true positive rate as the number of bad devices that are correctly classified to the total number of bad
devices in the test set. Similarly, the false positive rate is computed as the number of good device that are misclassified
to the total number of good devices in the test set.
4.2 Device Classification Accuracy
To show the detection accuracy, we present a series of ROC curves where: the x-axis represents the false positive rate
(FPR), the y-axis represents the true positive rate (TPR), and each point in ROC curves represents different threshold for
BP final belief scores. While doing so, we vary the parameters in Table 4, that might have effect on the performance.
Varying the Ground Truth Set. Fig.6(a) shows the ROC curves while varying ground truth sets built based on
destination IPs and app binaries. The figure clearly shows that the classification with the destination IP based ground
truth set provides modest accuracy. The best FPR and TPR it could achieve are 0.17 and 0.804, respectively. Such an
accuracy is not acceptable in practice as it misclassifies a considerable number of devices. This is mainly because a
single destination IP does correctly represent an app and thus a user’s general behavior, while most activities on mobile
devices incur through apps. Hence, if we treat each IP as an app, our approach will consider all devices connect to the
same IP as related; which in turn results in a lot of false associations harming the accuracy of graph-inference approach.
In fact, 39% IPs are used for servers hosting two or more unrelated apps in the given IP. In the following, we thus focus
on detection with an app-binary based ground truth set, and provide discussion about how we can improve detection
with a destination IP-based ground truth set in Section 6.
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Figure 6: ROC curves with various parameter setting
Varying the Definition of Popular Apps. Fig.6(b) shows the ROC curves with varying the definition of popular apps.
Although not significant, the figure shows that with less filtering such as NP = 10000, the false positive increases.
This is expected because many devices, if not all, using popular apps will be considered related, resulting in false
associations [24, 28, 61, 62].
Varying vt Values. Note that there is no consensus on the right value for vt [23, 56]. We thus show the results with
various vt, i.e., vt = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 in Fig. 6(c). As the figure shows, there is no significant difference on the false positive
8
0.9
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
AU
C
ε (edge potential parameter)
Mobile DNS
Figure 7: AUC when varying  for Mobile and DNS
rates and true positive rates while changing vt. We thus use vt = 5 for further discussion in the following without loss
of generality.
Varying Edge Potentials . Fig.6(d) shows the ROC curves while varying . To be specific, when  = 0.51, we can
achieve 0.89 TPR with only 0.002 FPR. Interestingly (as it is different from BP behavior in other applications such
as [24, 28]), our results are sensitive to , an edge potential parameter of BP. As shown in Fig.6(d), as  increases, the
false positive rates increase. Furthermore, we achieve the best accuracy with low values of  (e.g., 0.51). In the next
section, we present an in-depth analysis to demonstrate distinctive characteristics of the mobile traffic data that lead to
this behavior.
4.3 In-Depth Analysis of BP behavior
Identifying the most effective edge potential values to accurately classify graph nodes using BP is a known problem,
and recent work aims to automate the process of identifying such values [63]. That said, it has also been observed in a
variety of previous work [24, 25, 28] that the accuracy of BP is not significantly impacted by different  values. On the
contrary, recall that our results are sensitive to  as discussed in Section 4.2. In this section, we shed light on why edge
potential value  has an impact on our results, by providing in-depth analysis on distinctive network properties of two
bipartite graphs from different applications. In the first graph (Mobile),  has obvious impact on accuracy, while in the
other (DNS),  has no notable impact on accuracy.
Mobile represents the bipartite graph built from our dataset. For our experiments, we have used various ground truth
sets while changing vt to define a bad device, which, as shown in Fig.6(c), have no significant impact on false positive
rates and true positive rates. We also note that nodes in the ground truth drawn with different vts do not have much
topological difference. Without loss of generality, we thus use the ground truth drawn with vt = 5 to provide analysis
in the following.
DNS represents the bipartite graph between domains and IPs built from the active DNS dataset in [28]. To compare the
impact of  in different networks, we obtained the domain-ip bipartite graph and the ground truth labels on domains
used in their work [28]. Concretely, in their bipartite graph, domains and IPs are connected as edges, each of which
represents a domain resolving to an IP. They collected ground truth for bad domains by checking domains against VT
and for good domains by checking domains against Alexa top list [64].
To clearly capture the sensitivity to  in each of the two graphs (Mobile and DNS), we measure the area under the
ROC curve (AUC). Fig.7 shows AUC with varying , where the x-axis represents  and the y-axis represents the
corresponding AUC for each graph. The figure clearly shows that the classification accuracy in Mobile gets lower (from
0.98 to 0.97), as we increase  by 0.1 (0.51, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9). On the other hand, the classification accuracy in DNS
stays almost the same (0.96), regardless of . We argue that this different behavior of BP is due to the network structures
and the topological locations of nodes in the ground truth.
For any two nodes S and T in the graph, their impact on each other depends on multiple variables, the most important
of which are: (1) the length of the path between S and T , (2) the number of paths between S and T , and (3) the edge
potential parameter . First, the longer the path between S and T , the smaller S’s impact on T . This is because the edge
potential diminishes as it travels on the path between the two nodes (due to fraction multiplications as many as the
length of the path.) As a result, the final badness score will be insensitive to  in case of graphs with longer paths.
Second, the larger the number of paths between S and T , the higher the impact of S on T . This is because the final
belief at T is a function of the product of messages received on each path from S to T . For example, assume that a
bad node S has p paths to T , then S sends a bad message mB(i) and a good message mG(i) on a path i. Since S is
bad, mB(i) is larger than mG(i). The final bad (good) impact of S on T is a function of the product of the mB(i)
(mG(i)) messages from all the p paths. The larger the number of paths (p), the higher the difference between the mB(i)
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product and the mG(i) product, and hence, the higher the final badness score (due to the assumption that S is bad in the
example).
Finally, if we set  = 1, the path length will no longer have any impact, because length-1 has the same impact as
length-1000; if we set  close to 0.5, bS’s impact on bT greatly diminishes except for very short paths (e.g., 2).
We next compare two datasets from the two graphs (Mobile and DNS) in terms of there topological features. Specifically,
we are interested in nodes in the ground truth set.
Shortest path length: Consider two clusters: bad (CB) and good (CG). The important intuition behind BP using
homophily relationship is that each cluster’s intra-cluster distance is supposed to be low, whereas inter-cluster distance
between two clusters is supposed to be high. We thus measure the intra-cluster and inter-cluster distances in terms of
the shortest path lengths between all pair of nodes in CB and CG.
Fig.8 provides the matrix representing the shortest path lengths between nodes in CB and CG. The range of lengths
are from 0 to 20, each of which is illustrated as a color between black (0) and yellow (20) in the matrix. The figure
shows a few important observations. First, generally in both datasets, intra-cluster distances are smaller (darker and
greener colors in the figure) than inter-cluster distances between CB and CG. Second, CB’s intra-cluster distances are
the lowest (i.e., the darker and greener color in the figure) in both datasets. Finally, the difference between intra-cluster
and inter-cluster distances in DNS is much larger than that in Mobile.
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Figure 9: Shortest path length CDF between bad/good and bad/good nodes
Fig.9 presents the CDF of shortest path lengths between nodes in CB and CG, where the x-axis represents the shortest
path lengths and the y-axis represents the corresponding CDF (i.e., portion of node pairs); one line per each dataset. As
shown in Fig.9, the maximum lengths are 8 and 20 in Mobile and DNS, respectively. Interestingly, CB’s intra-cluster
distances are similar in the two datasets. Specifically, 86.7% of path lengths are within 4 (i.e., 2 or 4) in Mobile, and
79.9% of path lengths are within 4 in DNS.
On the other hand, we observe different characteristics in CG’s intra-cluster distances, and inter-cluster distance between
CB and CG for each dataset. In Mobile, 91% of path lengths between nodes in CG are smaller than or equal to 6 and
only 9% of path lengths are greater than 6; which are in fact similar to the inter-cluster distance between CB and CG
where 97.5% of path lengths are smaller than or equal to 6 and only 2.5% of path lengths are greater than 6. In DNS,
60% of path lengths between nodes in CG are smaller than or equal to 6, while 90% of path lengths between nodes in
CB and CG are more than 6. In other words, although the intra-cluster distance is smaller than the inter-cluster distance
in both datasets (i.e., the homophily relationships holds), the difference between intra-cluster and inter-cluster distances
in Mobile is relatively small. By contrast, the difference is relatively large in DNS. On average, differences between
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CB’s intra-cluster distance and the inter-cluster distance is only 0.9 in Mobile, whereas the difference is 8 in DNS, as
shown in Table 5.
Good-Good Bad-Bad Bad-Good
Mobile 5.542 4.089 4.922
DNS 6.43 4.523 12.062
Table 5: Average shortest path length
Recall how the path length and  affect the behavior of BP. Relatively long inter-cluster distance (i.e., 12) diminishes
the impact of bad (good) domains on good (bad) domains, irrespective of  in DNS. On the other hand,  plays a big
role in classification accuracy in Mobile, due to the small differences between intra-cluster and inter-cluster distances.
Concretely, bad devices have more impact on good ones when we use higher , resulting in the higher false positives.
Hence, it is required to carefully choose  close to 0.5 (e.g., 0.51) to avoid high false positives.
Closeness centrality (CC) of a node measures the average length of the shortest paths from the node to others [65].
Concretely, CC, of node u is computed as:
CCu = (N − 1)
/∑
v
l(v, u),
where N is the number of nodes in the graph and l(v, u) is the shortest path length between u and node v.
Essentially, CC takes into account both factors: the number of paths and the shortest path lengths. If all nodes in the
graph are highly connected to each other with short path lengths, the CCs of all nodes will be similar. Indeed, the
average CCs of bad and good devices in Mobile are similar (≈ 0.22) as shown in Table 6. On the other hand, the average
CC of bad domains is relatively small (0.088), compared to those of good and unknown domains (0.141 and 0.113,
respectively) in DNS. Along with the average shortest path given in Table 5, we can conclude that the bad nodes in DNS
Closeness
Centrality
Eigenvector
Centrality
Mobile(Bad) 0.223 0.0087
Mobile (Good) 0.219 0.0022
Mobile (Unknown) 0.219 0.0031
DNS (Bad) 0.088 0.005
DNS (Good) 0.141 0.179
DNS (Unknown) 0.113 0.006
Table 6: Network properties of the Mobile and DNS datasets
are much farther from other nodes and have less number of paths to other nodes, while good nodes are highly connected
to good or unknown nodes, which is expected. This is because good domains are not likely to have many connections
to bad domains, but have many connections to good or unknown domains. Hence, the classification accuracy is not
sensitive to  in in DNS.
Eigenvector centrality (EC) of a node measures its influence in the graph. Concretely, EC of node u is computed:
ECu = κ
−1
1
∑
v
AuvECv,
where v is u’s neighbor, A is the adjacency matrix of the graph, κ1 is its largest eigenvalue.
A node with high EC means that it is highly connected to other influential nodes. That is, messages are most frequently
passing through a node with high EC so that it will play a key role during belief propagation process. As shown in
Table 6, there is clear difference on ECs between Mobile and DNS graphs. In general, the average ECs of bad, good,
and unknown devices are almost similar (i.e., 0.0087, 0.0022, 0.0031, respectively) in Mobile graph. This means that
all nodes in the graph are highly connected with each other so that there are no significantly influential nodes in the
graph. Note that the ECs of bad devices is the highest, meaning that as the higher  is used, the score of bad devices can
dominate the network, resulting in high false positives. On the other hand, the average EC of good domains (0.179) are
much higher than those of bad and unknown domains (0.005 and 0.006, respectively) in DNS graph.
Fig.10 shows the distribution of eigenvector centralities of bad and good nodes in each dataset. Similar to results from
CC, Fig.10(b) shows that bad domains in DNS are significantly further from other nodes and are not connected to
influential nodes, meaning that there is a smaller number of paths to other nodes. Although the ECs of good domains
are high on average, they are well-distributed. This is in fact expected, as there can be influential and non-influential
domains.
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Figure 10: Eigenvector centrality distributions of the Mobile and DNS datasets
By our definition in Mobile, bad devices can have edges with all types of apps (i.e., bad, good, suspicious, and no-info
apps); good devices can have edges with good and no-info apps. This means that good devices could have a similar
number of paths with both good and bad devices; bad devices, however, have more paths with other bad devices than
good devices. Consequently, bad devices become relatively influential and connected to other influential bad devices,
resulting in the relatively high ECs as shown in Fig.10(a).
Recall how the number of paths and  affect the behavior of BP. One important observation in Fig.10 is that bad devices
are more influential on others than good devices in Mobile; whereas bad domains are less influential on others in DNS.
Along with results in Table 5, we can conclude that bad devices get more influences from bad devices, especially from
those influential bad devices, than good devices; so that good devices’ messages have relatively less impact on bad
devices. Consequently, there are not much change on false negatives, irrespective of , as opposed to false positives.
5 Post Analysis of Classified Devices
Recall that our goal is to identify unknown compromised devices whose owners often inadvertently install apps without
much consideration of consequences. To further verify the accuracy of the classification results in Section 4.2, we
measure the private information leakage on classified devices (Section 5.1) and study underlying network infrastructure
accessed by the devices (Section 5.2).
5.1 Privacy Leakage
It is known that devices having bad apps often leak private information [66, 67]. We examine samples of classified good
and bad devices to study private information leakage on them.
Ethics: It is important to note that our research is conducted on an anonymized version of the dataset where possible
privacy concerns are carefully considered and addressed. Before analysis, all identifiable and personal information
(e.g., phone number, user names) or device identifiers appearing in the traffic is anonymized or replaced with pseudo
information.
We have compiled a list of private information which often leaks in mobile networks based on the previous research
[9–12]. It has been shown privacy leaks often occur in a structured format, i.e., a key-value pair in HTTP headers
[11, 12, 41]. For example, a login password leaks with pwd=mypaSS123 where pwd is a key and mypaSS123 is a value.
Note that the key for a specific type of private information might be different depending on each app or device [11, 12].
From the dataset, we heuristically extract highly-related keywords to each type of private information. Examples of
such keywords are summarized in Table. 7 in the appendix. Note that we only present a few examples of keywords in
Table. 7, as the keywords are similar yet small variations such as imei1 and imei7. Note that we also validate that the
keywords are in fact used to leak the corresponding type of information by running apps on the two mobile devices
mentioned in Section 3. The private information might have been obfuscated in the traffic (e.g., hashing). However, it is
shown that most information leakage occurs in plaintext in mobile networks [11]. We thus argue that the following
results represent the general behavior of each device.
We sort unknown devices by their final beliefs, and choose top-100 devices with high scores as bad devices and bottom-
100 devices with low scores as good devices. Note that, we choose scores derived from the results with parameters
vt = 5 and  = 0.51, based on discussion in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Then, we inspect HTTP packets originated from
each device. Specifically, we search the keywords in each device’s all of the HTTP headers, and consider a device leaks
its private information if a non-empty key-value string corresponding to given keywords is found in any headers.
12
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
an
dr
oi
d 
id
de
vi
ce
 id
M
AC
uu
id
gu
id
im
ei
ud
id
ph
on
e 
nu
m
be
r
sim
 ca
rd
 n
um
be
r
im
si
us
er
id
pa
ss
w
or
d
bi
rt
hd
ay
em
ai
l
ge
nd
er
lo
ca
tio
n
Th
e 
Ra
tio
 o
f N
um
be
r o
f D
ev
ice
s Bad Device Good Device
(a) Statistics for Private information leakage
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
CD
F o
ft
he
 N
um
be
r o
f D
ev
ice
s
The Number of Leaked Private Information Types
Bad Device Good Device
(b) The CDF of the number of leaked information
types
Figure 11: Private Information Leakage
Fig.11(a) presents the ratio of the number of devices leaking each type of private information, where the x-axis
represents each information type and the y-axis represents the ratio of the number of devices (i.e., the number of devices
leaking corresponding information over the total number of devices). Generally, a large number of bad devices leak
private information compared to good devices. Notably, only bad devices leak highly sensitive information including
passwords and email addresses. Interestingly, some of the good devices also leak private information. Note that, as we
select good devices with bottom-100 scores, it is less likely that these classified good devices include false negatives.
One possible reason is that even non-bad apps, particularly location-based searching apps, sometimes leak private
information such as location data and device identifiers in order to support their functionality [10, 11]. In fact, we
observe that the majority of leaking apps on good devices are location-based searching apps.
To compare leaking on good and bad devices, we measure (i) the number of leaked private information types, (ii) the
distribution of the number of leaking apps and packets. Fig.11(b) shows the CDF of the number of leaked private
information type of devices, where the x-axis represents the number of leaked private information and the y-axis
represents the CDF of the number of devices (i.e., corresponding portion of devices). As shown in the figure, half of
good devices do not leak any information and 38% of good devices leak only one information type. On the contrary,
92% of bad devices leak at least one private information type and 36% of bad devices leak more than 5 information
types.
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Figure 12: The distribution of leaking apps and packets of devices
We further measure how many apps and packets of each device leak private information. Fig.12(a) and Fig.12(c) present
the CDFs of the leaking app and the leaking traffic ratios, respectively. The x-axis in each figure represents the leaking
app and leaking traffic ratios, respectively; the y-axis represents the portion of devices.
Leaking app ratio is measured by the number of apps leaking information over the total number of apps of each device;
leaking traffic ratio is measured by the number of packets leaking information over the total number of packets of each
device. As shown in the figures, although some good devices also leak private information, the ratios of leaking apps
and packets of each device are relatively small. Specifically, we observe that among all the good devices that leak
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private information (i.e., 50% of the good devices), 30% of them have less than 10% of leaking apps (Fig.12(a)); the
traffic of 41% of them has less than 10% of leaking packets (Fig.12(c)).
Fig.12(b) and Fig.12(d) present the distribution of the number of leaking apps and packets of devices, respectively.
The x-axis represents each device; the y-axis in each figure represents the corresponding number of leaking apps and
packets of each device, respectively. Note that 50% of good devices and 8% of bad devices do not leak any information
so that their numbers of leaking apps and packets are 0, which are not shown in the figures.
Interestingly, these leaking apps are not necessarily the same set as the bad apps in the ground truth set in Section 3. In
fact, 85% of these leaking apps are not the apps originally flagged as bad. In other words, the BP based inference relies
on a largely independent set of apps compared to the ground truth to detect bad devices.
Notably, we can see a clear difference between good and bad devices in terms of the number of leaking apps and
packets. Specifically, if any, good devices have only one or two leaking apps; whereas 35% of bad devices have more
than two leaking apps. Also, although some good devices leak information, the number of leaking packets are less than
30; whereas 23% of bad devices have more than 30 leaking packets.
In summary, our privacy leakage analysis suggests that our approach can reliably detect unknown bad devices.
Specifically, we show that although devices do not have bad apps from the ground truth, classified bad devices are
showing undesirable behavior in terms of leaking their personal information. This result is also promising in that we can
possibly identify unknown bad apps by our approach. Evidently, apps leaking sensitive information are not desirable
and we may further analyze apps causing privacy leakage on the classified bad device. Since our focus is to identify
devices, we leave the further investigation on apps as future work.
5.2 Network Infrastructure Accessed
We analyze the underlying network resources such as domains and IPs accessed by classified devices. It is well-known
that miscreants utilize fast fluxing [29], where a given malicious domain is hosted at different IPs in a short period
of time, to improve the availability of their malicious domains. Further, it is recently shown that miscreants move
their domains from one hosting provider to another frequently to evade take down [28]. In our dataset, 94% of
hosting providers possess a single AS (Autonomous System). Thus, the above observation on hosting providers can be
generalized to ASes. In this experiment, we seek to find out if indeed this AS behavior exists in the IPs accessed by
the apps in the classified devices. Fig. 13(a) shows the CDF of the number of ASes utilized to host domains accessed
by classified good and bad devices. Inline with above observations from previous research, it shows that bad devices
tend to access IPs from more ASes compared to good devices. The figure shows, more than 90% of bad devices access
IPs from more than 20 ASes, whereas only 30% of good devices exhibit the same behavior. As it is economical to
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Figure 13: The CDFs of the number of ASes utilized and the number of short lived domains accessed
create domains, nowadays, miscreants use many disposable domains to launch their attacks [68]. We thus also explore
whether domains accessed by bad devices exhibit such a behavior. First, for the domains in the dataset, we extract the
first seen and last seen dates of each domain from Farsight passive DNS repository [69], which collects DNS queries
resolved world-wide and serves historical DNS query data since 2011. We define a short lived domain as one whose
DNS footprint is less than 3 months. Most of these domains are usually taken down, sink holed, or black listed, if
identified malicious [30]. Fig. 13(b) shows the CDF of the number of short lived domains accessed by good and bad
devices. The figure confirms with the previous research findings where, in general, classified bad devices access more
short lived domains compared to good devices. It shows that 20% of bad devices access more than 40 short lived
domains, whereas only less than 10% of good devices exhibit the similar behavior.
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6 Discussion and Limitations
Baseline Approaches. A naive baseline approach of utilizing a blacklist is restrictive and unable to detect compromised
devices having previously unknown bad apps. In fact, our approach in general can detect twice as many unknown bad
devices not in the ground truth. An important consideration at early stages of detection is to identify which predictive
model would work well to infer compromised devices from graph structured data. We evaluate three popular techniques:
(1) Unsupervised node embedding along with Random Forest (Node2Vec) [36], (2) Label Propagation (LP) [34], and
(3) BP. Fig.14 shows the ROC curves for the three approaches with the ground truth drawn with vt = 5. The ROC
curves show that BP provides a low FPR, compared to LP and Node2Vec along with RF. There are a few possible
reasons why BP performs slightly better: (a) node embedding based approach fails to capture labels into the embedding
and may result in inaccurate classification when two or more nodes have similar structure but different labels, and (b)
LP simply takes the average of the neighboring node values during each iteration and, unlike BP, it fails to capture the
homophily relationships among neighboring nodes. Thus, it is not surprising that LP has the lowest performance out of
the three approaches. Further, BP is several orders of magnitude faster than Node2vec.
App Strings and Filtering. Our study with the HTTP headers assumes that app strings revealed can characterize a
specific app and its badness based on the prior research results [23, 55]. However, it is also known that malware writers
often distribute repackaged apps by adding malicious codes to popular legitimate apps that may include the app string
of such legitimate apps [53]. As we filter out popular apps to avoid false associations in BP, such repackaged apps may
lead to false negatives; meaning that devices having only maliciously repackaged apps might be filtered and thus not
detected. However, note that our approach does not use the knowledge of bad apps during the inference. In fact, we
show that bad devices are detected independently from the known bad apps and our approach can be further extended to
identify unknown bad apps by investigating the apps in detected devices in Section 5. We thus argue that considering a
limited number of known apps does not have a significant impact on the detection performance.
HTTPS Encrypted Traffic. Our approach can be applied both encrypted and not-encrypted traffic by extracting data
in different ways. As mentioned in Section 3, however, a large percentage of mobile apps still rely on HTTP protocol
for their communication for various reasons [12,39–43]. It has also been observed in previous study that most malicious
traffic is carried over HTTP for the same reasons [31, 50]. We thus believe that our approach with the high accuracy
of detection (98% AUC) using HTTP traffic can successfully identify the compromised devices in real-world mobile
networks.
Towards dealing with HTTPS, we also suggested a naive approach to use IP header only. While the detection accuracy
is not promising as much as one to use HTTP, there is a line of work known as app fingerprinting using IP headers or
TCP traffic patterns that can be applied to improve the accuracy [20, 32, 38, 70]. That is, one may employ a supervised
classifier to determine the specific app generating the observed HTTPS traffic [32, 37]. Once the apps in the traffic are
identified, one can label the apps using external sources such as VT, and build a bipartite graph on which inference can
be performed to detect compromised devices. We leave the investigation of this direction as future work.
VT intelligence. We used VT intelligence to label the apps to establish ground truth. It has been pointed out in previous
research that VT may have a limited coverage which could possibly bias results [53, 57]. We argue that the source of
establishing ground truth is independent of our approach and an organization may get access to other sources [71, 72]
which can possibly further reduce false positives and negatives. The goal of our approach is to start with a small set of
ground truth based on any accessible intelligence source (VT or others) to expand the knowledge using graph inference
to eventually identify devices which may have installed bad apps not detected previously. As discussed in Section 5,
85% of leaking apps in detected devices are not the ones originally detected by VT, yet leaking a large amount of private
information.
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7 Related Work
Malicious App Detection. Malicious app detection research falls into two categories: code and network-analysis.
Code analysis can further be categorized into static and dynamic analysis. Static analysis approaches derive signatures
from app binaries based on features drawn from known malicious apps [73, 74]. However, it is often easy to evade
detection by static analysis through code obfuscation and repackaging. Dynamic analysis monitors the behavior of an
app such as privacy leakage or API calls [10, 75]. Unlike traditional desktop machines, however, it is often hard to
perform run-time analysis on mobile devices because they are resource constrained. Network-analysis based approaches
utilize traffic patterns such as packet sizes and detect anomalous network footprints [16, 17, 19, 76]. However, these
approaches still extract each app-specific features which can easily be obfuscated. Also, they have the limitation that
they cannot be applied for general purpose. Specifically, most proposed approaches are analyzing android-based apps,
which cannot be directly used to detect iOS counterparts [10, 13, 73, 77]. By contrast, our approach identifies unknown
compromised devices through graph inference without relying on device or app-specific features. Indeed, this is one
of our key contribution that a network administrator does not need to do deep analysis on each individual device on
the network, but can infer if an unknown device is compromised from other known devices. This also enables the
administrator to quickly manage possible threats encountered at large-scale.
There are only a few research efforts that approach mobile security from a network administrator’s point of view. Lever
et al. provided a large-scale network level analysis of mobile malware by investigating the DNS traffic of mobile
devices [5]. This research is valuable in that authors show infection rate in real traces. However, authors did not provide
a solution to identify mobile threats. Zhu et al. proposed a method based on social network analysis to prevent worm
propagation in cellular network [4]. The focus of this research was on worm propagation through MMS and SMS,
which is different from our approach. Sharif et al. propose a proactive approach that predicts if a user is connecting a
malicious domain or web content by observing her mobile browsing behavior [31]. In this paper, we focus on apps
causing devices to be compromised rather than domains.
Graph-inference Approaches. A graph-inference approach has been employed in many different applications
including anomaly detection, malware detection, fake social network account detection, fraud detection, and malicious
domain detection. These applications construct different types of graphs including file-machine or file-relation
graphs [33, 35, 58], reviewer-product graphs [25, 59], host-domain graphs [24, 27], domain-IP graphs [28] and social
network account graphs [78]. Although researchers have applied BP on a variety of applications, there is little study on
the effect of BP parameters in different types of networks. In fact, most researchers either mentioned the results are not
sensitive to BP parameters such as edge potentials [24, 28] or stated that specific values work well without any further
description [25, 33, 58]. However, we observe that the effectiveness of BP is relatively sensitive to characteristics of
mobile networks. In Section 4.3, we thus discuss the unique characteristic of mobile networks in terms of their topology
(i.e., where devices are closely connected to each other) compared to DNS based applications, and provide theoretical
and experimental analysis on how such uniqueness may affect the results of BP.
8 Conclusion
We proposed a graph-inference based approach to identify compromised mobile devices. In doing so, we applied a
well-known algorithm, BP, based on the intuition that devices sharing a similar set of apps will have a similar probability
of being compromised. We studied this problem on real-world data that faithfully represents actual behavior of mobile
users with which we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. We further study the impact of graph topology
on BP parameters and highlight the distinct features of the mobile graph. Finally, our privacy leakage and hosting
infrastructure post-analyses support the claim that our approach can reliably detect unknown compromised devices
without relying on device-specific features. It is also important to take appropriate actions after compromised devices
are detected. In fact, we also discuss that further investigation on detected devices might be helpful to identify unknown
malicious apps, which we leave as a future work.
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Appendix
Category Type Example Keywords
Sim card number iccid, simserialnumber, simno, simnumber, sim
Phone IMSI imsi, mobileimsi, user-imsi, imsi1, imsi_no, x-imsi, client-imsi
Phone number phone_num, phone, tel_num, mobile_no, cellphonenumber, cellphone,
userphone, tel_number, usrphonenum
User ID user_nick, user_id, user_name, userid, x-userid, log-user-id, login_name,
client-user-id
User Email user_email, email, login_email, email_name, contact_email, acc_email
Birthday birthday, user_birth, customer_birthday, passenger_birthday
Gender gender, sex, client_gender
Credential Password userpwd, password, passwd, user_pwd, _password, pwd
Location Location longitude, latitude, lng_lat, coordinate, homeaddress, coords,
geo_location, gps_long, geoInfo
UDID udid, device_udid
Device ID devid, device_id, x-device-id, deviceid
Device IMEI imei, device-imei, phone-imei, imei1, mobileimei
Identifier GUID guid, phoneguid, dev-guid
UUID uuid, device_uuid, phoneuuid, x-device-uuid, uuid2
MAC user_mac, mac, mac_addr, _mac, x-macaddress
Android ID android_id, androidid, _androidid, androidid1
Table 7: List of private information, type, and example keywords
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